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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: 
Due to a greater difficulty to achieve compromise, large decision making groups tend to adopt less 
extreme decisions. This implies that larger boards are associated with lower corporate risk taking. We 
test whether a similar effect applies to the case of Japanese firms. The result is expected to be weaker 
since Japanese boards form relatively homogenous groups. We further argue that growth opportunities 
moderate the relation between board size and risk taking. 
Research Findings/Results: 
Our results indicate that firms with larger boards exhibit lower performance volatility as well as lower 
bankruptcy risk. However, the effect is not as significant as in the US. The low cross-sectional 
variation in risk taking among Japanese firms is found to play a role. In addition, we show that the 
effect of board size is less significant when firms have plenty of investment opportunities, but much 
stronger when firms have fewer growth options. 
Theoretical Implications: 
Considering that risk taking contributes to firm performance, our results offer a rationale as to why 
larger boards might be associated with lower performance. However, they also suggest that this effect 
should be less detrimental to firms with significant investment opportunities.  
Practical Implications: 
Firms should adapt their decision processes to their business environment. In particular, they may need 
to adjust the size of their boards to the characteristics of their investment opportunity sets. Firms with 
fewer growth options would gain most by operating with smaller boards. By restricting their ability to 
take risks, firms could undermine their growth potential and performance.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, board size, risk taking, investment opportunities, performance 
volatility, bankruptcy risk.  
 
  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Risk taking is critical to corporate success. Whilst it is true that some firms are likely 
to fail as a result of the risks they take, few can expect to thrive without incurring a certain 
degree of risk. But what determines cross sectional differences in risk taking? Agency theory 
asserts that managers are reluctant to undertake risky projects out of concern for their personal 
welfare (Fama, 1980; May, 1995; Holmstrom, 1999). By analysing the decisions of a sample 
of plant managers, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) establish that the latter typically prefer 
not to take any risk. Focusing on the differential effect of a change in legislation providing 
greater protection from hostile takeovers, Low (2009) reveals that managers whose positions 
became more secure reduced their risk taking. Conversely, Mishra (2011) demonstrates that 
better monitoring through multiple large shareholders is associated with higher risk taking. 
From these results, it appears that agency conflicts play an important role in explaining 
differences in risk across firms.  
Research in social psychology and organizational behaviour suggests a different 
perspective. According to Kogan and Wallach (1964) and Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969), 
the size of the decision-making group tends to have a negative effect on risk taking. Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986, 1991) argue that riskier projects are less likely to be accepted because of the 
greater difficulty to reach an agreement in large groups. Consistent with this idea, Cheng 
(2008) shows that US firms with larger boards are associated with lower performance 
volatility. Likewise, Adams and Ferreira (2010) reveal that larger groups are less extreme in 
their betting decisions while Bar et al. (2005) establish that team-managed mutual funds are 
less likely to deviate from their professed investment styles compared to individual managers. 
In this paper, we try to address two questions. Our first question is whether the 
negative effect of board size on corporate risk taking extends to Japanese firms. There are 
various reasons to suspect that the outcome might be different. Japanese boards are mainly 
populated with insiders (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Viner, 1993; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000; 
Jackson and Moerke, 2005; Li and Harisson, 2008; Aman and Nguyen, 2012). Their 
responsibilities are broader than in the US. According to Japan’s Commercial Code, the board 
of directors is not only in charge of overseeing the company’s business, but also responsible 
for making decisions on the way business is conducted. Decision-making is usually more 
collegial and involves greater effort at achieving consensus (Hofstede, 1980; Ouchi, 1981; 
Keys and Miller, 1984; Key et al., 1994; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). In addition, 
 
 
Wiersema and Bird (1993) underline the homogeneity in Japanese organizations and infer 
from this observation that managers with dissimilar profiles are more likely to leave the firm, 
thus further increasing the uniformity of viewpoints already present in the organization. The 
Japanese business culture is also characterized by a low degree of individualism, especially 
relative to the US (Hofstede, 1980). At the board level, these characteristics (i.e., greater 
uniformity in managerial profiles and greater conformity in displayed behaviours) have the 
consequence that a lesser diversification of opinion is achieved by adding more directors. It 
thus follows that corporate risk taking in Japan might not decrease as much in relation to 
board size as in the US (Cheng, 2008). 
Our second question is whether growth opportunities play a moderating role in the 
relation between board size and risk taking. The underlying model by Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 
1991) presumes that all decision-making units evaluate the same number of projects. Only the 
size of the unit varies. However, firms have typically heterogeneous investment opportunity 
sets.  Hence, there is no reason to believe that the effect should be the same for a firm with 
plenty of attractive investments and another one with few investments available. In fact, we 
argue that the negative effect of a large board should be weaker for high-growth firms but 
more severe for low-growth firms. The reasoning is that when a firm has a large number of 
projects, these projects can be allocated to and evaluated by smaller sub-groups of directors so 
that each of these sub-groups are effectively evaluating the same number of projects as the 
whole, but smaller, board of a firm with fewer projects. As a result, a greater proportion of 
risky projects survive the screening process.  
Our empirical investigation involves several measures of risk. In line with Cheng 
(2008) we first estimate the dispersion over time of a firm’s performance using operating 
profits, market-to-book value of assets, and stock returns. We then relate these risk indicators 
to the average board size and other key firm characteristics, such as firm size and leverage. 
But, since these risk indicators ignore the information in within-firm performance variations, 
our second approach is to measure risk by the absolute deviation from the firm’s expected 
performance. Consistent with Adams et al. (2005) and Sanders and Hambrick (2007), we then 
use panel regressions to relate these risk measures to board size. This procedure is known as 
Glejser (1969) heteroskedasticity test. As robustness check, we consider two indicators of 
bankruptcy risk: Altman’s Z-score and Olson’s O-score whose calibration to Japanese 
companies is provided by Xu and Zhang (2009).  
Using a large panel of Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the 
period 2003-2007, we find that board size is negatively related to risk taking. However, the 
 
 
relation is not as significant as in the US which is partly due to the low cross sectional 
dispersion in risk taking among Japanese firms. We show that the effect of board size depends 
on the firm’s investment opportunity set. When a firm has plenty of investment opportunities, 
a larger board does not necessarily result in lower risk taking because many risky projects can 
survive the screening process. On the other hand, if the firm has few investment opportunities, 
the effect of a larger board is to cause a significant reduction in the proportion of risky 
projects.i    
The negative relation between board size and risk may also reflect an equilibrium in 
which both variables are jointly determined in response to the firm’s environment (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). For example, firms may consider smaller boards to be better suited to 
risky business conditions. In that case, decreasing the board’s size will not induce greater risk 
taking. On the other hand, the notion that risk is related to the complexity of the firm’s 
operations suggests that risky firms should operate with larger boards because of their greater 
need for advice and monitoring (Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Guest, 2008). To 
identify the exogenous variation in board size, we use the firm’s free float because shares 
dispersed in the public are unlikely to involve board representation. At the same time, 
variations in the free float should not affect the firm’s governance and incentives to take risk, 
especially since institutional ownership is included in the risk regression. This instrumental 
variable approach generates somewhat larger coefficients for board size. However, exogeneity 
tests indicate that the difference with the OLS estimates is not statistically significant.  
This study adds to the growing literature on optimal board structures. In a seminal 
paper, Yermack (1996) demonstrates the higher performance of firms with smaller boards of 
directors. However, Coles et al. (2008) show that this effect depends on the firm’s 
characteristics. When firms have greater need for advice and monitoring, they actually benefit 
from operating with bigger boards. This may explain why earlier studies have found 
conflicting results regarding the effect of board size on firm performance (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). In essence, these studies have mixed firms that benefit from the 
additional resources associated with larger boards with other firms for which larger boards 
lead to higher coordination problems. In this paper, our focus is on corporate risk taking. 
While Cheng (2008) suggests that larger boards are generally detrimental to risk taking, our 
first contribution is to show that this effect may depend on the composition of the board. 
More accurately, boards characterized by greater homogeneity, as is the case in Japan, are less 
likely to affect the selection of risky projects as their size increases. Our second contribution 
is to show that the effect of board size depends on the firm’s investments opportunities. To be 
 
 
more precise, larger boards may not necessarily lead to lower risk taking and therefore lower 
firm value. But firms with few investment opportunities should make sure that their decision 
making processes are congruent with their low growth profile and would most benefit from 
operating with smaller boards.  
This study also contributes to the literature on corporate risk taking. Since agency 
conflicts related to managerial risk aversion can be a major cause of suboptimal risk taking, 
the initial focus has been on the effect of incentives, especially equity ownership and 
executive stock options (Cohen et al., 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; 
Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Wright et al., 2007). Another equally important determinant of 
risk taking is the monitoring role of financial institutions (Wright et al., 1996) and multiple 
large shareholders (Mishra, 2011). More recently, the attention has turned to the role of 
investor protection (John et al., 2008) and creditor rights (Acharya et al., 2011). Culture and 
local values have also been shown to explain the difference in risk taking across countries 
(Griffin et al., 2009).  Our study adds to this growing list by extending the analysis of Cheng 
(2008) to the case of Japanese firms and by emphasizing the role of growth opportunities.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first provide a selected review of the 
literature on corporate risk taking and present the hypotheses. We then describe the sample 
and empirical methods. The empirical results are presented in the following section. 
 
REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
While agency conflicts and the mechanisms designed to mitigate these conflicts are 
important determinants of corporate risk taking, the following review focuses on the role of 
decision processes.  
 
The Effect of Board Size on Corporate Risk Taking 
In an influential paper, Kogan and Wallach (1964) argue that the size of the decision-
making group decreases its propensity to take risk. The conventional wisdom is that it is much 
more difficult to convince a large group of peers to make controversial decisions considering 
the potentially adverse fallout. On the other hand, advocating a prudent alternative is unlikely 
to be met with stern opposition. It follows that large groups should express moderate positions 
that represent a compromise between the group’s individual positions (Moscovici and 
Zavalloni, 1969). 
 
 
Adams and Ferreira (2010) prove the existence of this moderation effect by comparing 
the betting behaviour of groups and individuals. While groups seem, on average, to behave in 
practically the same way as individuals, their bets are more likely to cluster around the 
historical mean while individual bets exhibit a greater tendency to stray away from the 
average. In addition, the dispersion of bets appears to decrease with the size of the group. In a 
similar study, Bar et al. (2005) examine the behaviour of individually-managed and team-
managed mutual funds. Their main finding is that team-managed funds are less likely to 
deviate from their purported investment style. These funds also display a higher propensity to 
herd compared to individually-managed funds. The consequence is a marked difference in 
return volatility between the two types of funds, but no clear difference in average returns.  
Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) formalise the idea that the final decision of a group 
reflects a compromise among the opposite views of each group member. For example, bad 
projects are likely to be rejected since they can only be accepted if a sufficient number of 
group members concur (wrongly) that they are good projects. But the approval of (truly) good 
projects also requires a similar convergence of views between group members. It follows that 
large groups end up selecting average projects whose performance also tends to be more 
stable.  
Applying this notion to corporate boards, Cheng (2008) provides evidence that the 
accounting and market-based performance of firms with larger boards is significantly less 
volatile. Firms with larger boards also appear to select less risky investments as indicated by 
the smaller dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. In the case of financial institutions, 
Pathan (2009) shows that board size is associated with lower return volatility. His results are 
also robust to alternative risk measures such as the Z-score or the proportion of 
nonperforming loans, which is likely to reflect riskier lending practices.  
Based on the notion of moderation in groups, we can outline the first hypothesis 
whose credit can be attributed to Chen (2008).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Larger corporate boards are associated with lower risk taking. 
 
The Role of Growth Opportunities 
Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) build their argument for firms contemplating a fixed 
number of projects. In that case, adding more participants to the decision making group 
necessarily results in a higher proportion of risky projects being rejected and a higher 
proportion of low-risk projects being accepted. For the purpose of comparing risk taking 
 
 
across firms, it is thus critical to control for that parameter. In other words, one needs to 
compare the effect of board size for firms having the same number of projects. But obviously, 
firms have heterogeneous investment opportunity sets.ii For instance, a young innovative firm 
has typically more risky projects compared to an older firm of comparable size.  
Because of this heterogeneity, the effect of board size is likely to vary across firms. In 
particular, a larger decision making group may not necessarily lead to a higher proportion of 
low-risk projects provided the firm has many investment opportunities. The idea is that, 
although a larger number of (good or bad) risky projects will end up being rejected, there will 
still be plenty of (mostly good) risky projects to pass the screening process. With this final set, 
a project-rich firm should have enough risky investments to undertake despite the rejection of 
many of its initial projects (due to the tighter screening associated with a larger board). As a 
result, this firm will exhibit a higher market value together with a high-risk profile. This 
implication fits well with recent findings from Coles et al. (2008) that larger boards can add 
value in some circumstances even though their impact is considered to be typically negative 
(Yermack, 1996; Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009).  
In contrast, a firm with few investment opportunities will end up eliminating most of 
its risky projects if it happens to have a large decision making group. Assuming low-risk 
investments are unlimited (for example, investing in liquid assets is always possible) the 
consequence is that the proportion of risky projects on the firm’s balance sheet will decrease 
with the number of board members. As a result, firms with few investment opportunities and 
large boards should display a lower risk profile along with a lower market value.  
Altogether, the above arguments suggest a more specific hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The negative relation between board size and corporate risk is stronger for 
firms with few investment opportunities, but weaker (and possibly insignificant) for firms with 
plenty of growth opportunities. 
 
To illustrate why larger boards need not be associated with lower risk taking, let us 
consider three firms displayed in Figure 1. To simplify the exposition, suppose that firm 2 has 
the same number of projects as firm 1, but twice the number of directors. According to the 
arguments of Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) encapsulated in Hypothesis 1, firm 2 should 
exhibit a significantly lower level of risk taking. Hence, its lower position to the right of firm 
1. Now, suppose that firm 3 has twice the number of projects available to firms 1 and 2, and 
the same number of directors as firm 2. Because it has a larger number of projects as well as a 
 
 
larger number of directors, firm 3 might allocate the responsibility of screening half of its 
projects to half of its directors, and the responsibility of screening the other half of its projects 
to the other half of its board members. In that case, the proportion of risky project being 
selected by each group of directors will be the same as for firm 1. Hence the position of firm 3 
at the same level of risk as firm 1 right above firm 2.  
In this theoretical example, risk taking can be totally unrelated to the firm’s board size. 
In practice, it is unlikely that the allocation of responsibilities will be as radical. However, it is 
common that some tasks are allocated to a specific group of directors. For instance, reviewing 
the firm’s accounts is essentially the responsibility of the members of the audit committee. 
Similarly, firms with a lot of projects are likely to require a certain specialisation among their 
board members. This ensures that each director is not overwhelmed by the task of assessing 
each project. As a result, the position of a firm similar to firm 3 is more likely to be between 
firm 2 and firm 3. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample selection 
To perform our tests and provide new insights relative to Cheng (2008), we focus on 
Japanese firms. This case is interesting because the composition of Japanese boards presents a 
greater degree of homogeneity. As a result, the moderation effect associated with larger 
decision making groups is expected to be weaker than in the US. Indeed, the very idea of a 
group effect on decision making is that adding more members to the group is tantamount to 
increasing the number of filtering layers through which each decision is evaluated. When the 
group members are randomly selected from a pool of managers with different characteristics, 
the screening of decisions becomes tighter as the size of the group increases. This implies that 
a smaller proportion of extreme (i.e., risky) projects tends to be selected by larger groups. 
However, when the selection of group members is highly correlated, the filtering process does 
not become tighter as additional members join the group. The explanation comes from the 
fact that these additional members can be viewed as being redundant. It follows that there 
might only be a weak relation between the size of the decision making group and the riskiness 
of the projects selected by the group.iii 
On a number of criteria, Japanese boards can be described as remarkably homogenous. 
First, it has long been noted that they essentially involve the firm’s top managers (Abegglen 
 
 
and Stalk, 1985; Dalton and Kesner, 1987; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000; Jackson and Moerke, 
2005; Li and Harisson, 2008). Put differently, outside directors are conspicuous by their 
absence. In fact, Aman and Nguyen (2012) show that a majority of Japanese firms have no 
outside director. The situation is unlikely to change in the near future since new listing rules 
introduced by the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2009 only require firms to appoint one outside 
director or one independent statutory auditor. In the US, 8 directors out of 10 come from 
outside the firm (Coles et al., 2008). These directors bring a unique perspective and are hired 
for their expertise, which might not be available inside the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Because US boards basically consist of outside directors (especially 
if the CEO is excluded), increasing their size leads to a greater diversity in executive profiles 
and this tends to result in lower risk taking. But for Japanese boards, a larger size might not 
result in a greater variety of experience since most directors are trained as generalists and 
have spent much of their careers with the same firm (Wairlerdsak and Suehiro, 2004). In a 
blunt statement, Viner (1993) observes that the path to the boardroom begins on the first day a 
new graduate arrives at the company’s offices.  
Another expression of the lack of diversity in Japanese boards is the near absence of 
female directors. A recent survey by Globe Women based in Washington shows that only 3% 
of Japanese firms have female directors against 61% in the US. Among all directors, the 
proportion of women is only 0.2% in Japan against 9.3% in the US. Terjesen et al. (2009) 
provide an interesting chart comparing the percentage of female directors in several countries. 
Japan is found to sit by far at the bottom of the list. Overall, Japanese boards can be pictured 
as almost exclusively composed of male executives having gone through similar experiences 
since they joined the company as young university graduates. Even in countries where boards 
are dominated by insiders, greater depth in the executive labor market ensures that their 
experience is more diverse than in the case of Japanese firms. As a result, Hypothesis 1 is 
likely to be weaker in Japan because of a lesser moderation effect associated with group size. 
 
Within-Firm Over-Time Performance Variability 
To generate estimates of corporate risk taking, we first follow Cheng (2008) and 
calculate the volatility over time of a firm’s performance (called within-firm across-time 
volatility). This approach is relatively common and has been routinely applied to stock returns 
to produce estimates of return volatility as well as its decomposition into systematic and 
unsystematic risk. For instance, Pathan (2009) examines the role of board power on the risk-
 
 
taking behavior of US bank holding companies using this type of decomposition. Like Cheng 
(2008) we consider three measures of performance: ROA, Tobin’s Q and stock returns. ROA 
is defined as operating income over total assets. Tobin’s Q is proxied by the market to book 
value of assets. While these two measures are computed annually, stock returns adjusted for 
dividends and splits are calculated monthly.  
The performance measures are obviously correlated. For instance, higher returns are 
associated with higher Q ratios. Both measures also reflect higher realized or anticipated 
profitability. As a result, a positive correlation is also likely to exist between the 
corresponding volatility measures. In this respect, Wei and Zhang (2006) show that the higher 
(idiosyncratic) return volatility of US firms is related to their increasing earnings variability. 
In addition, we calculate industry-adjusted volatility using the 2-digit classification from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. For example, industry-adjusted volatility of ROA is computed as the 
volatility of ROA less median industry-ROA. These measures take out the variation in 
performance over time common to the industry, and can be interpreted as measures of 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
This way of estimating risk has the unfortunate consequence of collapsing the initial 
panel (of 6,399 firm-year observations) into a single cross section (of 1,324 firms). To explain 
the cross sectional difference in risk, we thus calculate the average value of the explanatory 
variables over the sample period. The association between the 23 risk taking measures and 
their determinants is estimated by OLS with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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 (1) 
On the left-hand side, RISK represents the standard deviation of ROA, log of Tobin’s Q, or 
stock returns. On the right-hand side, BS is the number of board members; INDIR is the 
percentage of inside directors; SO indicates that the firm’s executives have received stock 
options. DIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by all directors; INST is the cumulated 
ownership of institutional investors. LNTA is the log of total assets; DEBT is the ratio of total 
debt to total assets; CAPEX is capital expenditures divided by sales; AGE is proxied by the 
number of years since the firm’s listing; IND is a vector of industry dummies based on the 
stock exchange’s 2-digit industry classification; and iη  is the error term.  
 
 
In equation 1, the log of board size (BS) is the main explanatory variable and we 
expect its estimated coefficient to be negative. Board composition (INDIR) and financial 
incentives (SO and DIROWN) are included because of their potential effect on risk-taking. 
Stock options are considered to encourage managers to take greater risk due to their convex 
payoff structures. Sanders and Hambrick (2007) show that firms whose CEOs are loaded up 
with stock options exhibit extreme performance (i.e., very large gains as well as very large 
losses). Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) establish that managers of oil and gas companies whose 
compensation is more sensitive to stock return volatility (due mainly to their stock options) 
take more exploration risk and maintain lower hedge ratios. Similarly, Coles et al. (2006) find 
that greater sensitivity to stock return volatility tends to induce riskier investment policies and 
higher financial leverage. Focusing on the change in corporate risk surrounding the passage of 
anti-takeover legislation in the US, Low (2009) confirms the tendency of managers to turn 
away from risk, especially when the threat of market discipline is removed. However, another 
interesting finding is that equity-linked compensation is able to mitigate this risk aversion. 
Following Cheng (2008) the remaining variables are included because of their influence on 
firm performance and because of the relation between performance level and volatility.  
 
Absolute Deviation from Expected Performance 
A more ingenious way proposed by Adams et al. (2005) for gauging corporate risk 
taking consists in measuring the absolute deviation from the firm’s expected performance. 
Standard deviation of performance and absolute deviation from expected performance are two 
closely-related measures of risk. The key difference is that standard deviation is a weighted 
average deviation from the firm’s average performance, while absolute deviation is the 
divergence with respect to the firm’s expected performance at a particular point in time. 
Using ROA and Tobin’s Q, expected performance is predicted using the following models 
including year and industry dummies: 
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Consistent with Adams et al. (2005) and Cheng (2008) we include the board variables in the 
performance equations on the premise that they affect the level as well as the volatility of a 
firm’s performance.iv   
To predict stock returns, we use the CAPM and Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model: 
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RM is the monthly return on a value-weighted market index; RF is the one-month repo rate. 
SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low) are the returns on the zero-investment 
factor-mimicking portfolios constructed according to Fama and French (1993).  
In equations 2-4, the error term t,iε  represents the unexpected component of 
performance. Since we are interested in the deviation from expected performance, we take the 
absolute value of t,iε  as the proxy of firm i’s risk-taking at time t. This variable is then 
regressed on the variables appearing on the right-hand side of the performance equations. 
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) use a similar approach to estimate the effect of stock options on 
corporate risk taking.  
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With stock returns, the year dummies are replaced by monthly dummies. Equation 5 is then 
estimated using GLS random effects. Adams et al. (2005) and Pathan (2009) concede that 
fixed effect regressions are not suitable due to a lack of significant time-variation in board 
size. Zhou (2001) shows that fixed effects regressions can fail to detect a relationship even 
when the data is known to involve one. In addition, the panel is characterized by a large cross 
section and a short time series, causing fixed effects estimates to be inconsistent.  
 
Bankruptcy Risk Indicators 
Risk taking should also be associated with a higher probability of bankruptcy. In fact, 
the concept of risk involves the notion that higher risk should increase the odds of failure. In 
 
 
this respect, two models have been widely used in literature as well as in practice: Altman’s 
Z-score and Olson’s O-score. Both models have been calibrated by Xu and Zhang (2009) to 
fit Japanese firms. Given that we don’t have bankruptcy data, we simply rely on their 
estimates. More precisely, Xu and Zhang (2009) provide the following results. 
 
54321 V3183.1V4303.0V0411.1V2139.0V5294.01776.4score-Z   (6) 
V1 = Working capital/Total assets;  
V2 = Retained earnings/Total assets;  
V3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets;  
V4 = Market value of equity/Book value of total liabilities;  
V5 = Sales/Total assets.  
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(7) 
W1 = log (Total assets deflated by GNP price-level index);  
W2 = Total liabilities/Total assets;  
W3 = Working capital/Total assets;  
W4 = Current liabilities/Current assets;  
W5 = 1 if total liabilities > total assets, = 0 otherwise;  
W6 = Net income/Total assets;  
W7 = Operating cash flows/Total liabilities; 
W8 = 1 if net income < 0 for the last 2 years, = 0 otherwise;  
W9 = (Net income – Lagged net income)/ (|Net income| + |Lagged net income|). 
 
While the O-score increases with the probability of bankruptcy, the Z-score varies in 
the opposite direction. We thus take its inverse to make it comparable to the other risk 
measures. We also check that the values of the Z-score are all positive to justify this 
transformation. Because the bankruptcy risk indicators can be calculated each year, we use 
the same panel regression framework as in the previous section.  
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SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Our sample includes most Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over 
the period 2003-2007. We are restricted to that period because of data availability. Our source 
for board and ownership information is Nikkei CGES (Corporate Governance Evaluation 
System). This database is offered by the Nihon Keizai (Nikkei) newsgroup and contains 
governance information collected from annual reports. 1,450 firms could be identified with 
complete governance information. Financial firms (banks, insurance, brokerage and asset 
management companies) were dropped because of their distinct performance and risk 
characteristics. This gave a final sample of 1,324 firms corresponding to 6,399 firm-year 
observations and 76,717 firm-month observations.v Consistent with the composition of the 
Japanese economy, the more represented industries are electric machinery, machine tools, 
chemicals and trading companies. The dataset is completed with accounting and stock return 
information using AMSUS (Active Management Support System) proposed by Quick Corp.vi  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics regarding firm characteristics, performance 
volatility, and board structures. At first glance, volatility of ROA appears to be particularly 
low at only 1.85%. However, this figure is consistent with the results of John et al. (2008) and 
Acharya et al. (2011) which both show that Japanese firms have the lowest level of cash flow 
volatility among 39 selected countries. To offer a more striking perspective, the cash flow 
volatility of Japanese firms is only 2.1% compared to 9% for US firms. Volatility of industry-
adjusted ROA is slightly lower at 1.76% which suggests that only a small part of a firm’s 
profitability is governed by industry conditions. At about 9.2%, volatility of monthly stock 
returns seems to be comparable to the typical volatility of a US stock whose average is about 
10%.  
Japanese boards consist on average of 10.4 members, which is close to the figure for 
US firms reported by Coles et al. (2008). As a rule, Japanese firms appear to have 
dramatically reduced the size of their boards in the last few years. Analyzing a sample of 
large Japanese firms over the period 1992-1996, Basu et al. (2007) indicate that their boards 
typically consisted of 28 members.vii Still, some firms exhibit very large boards, like Toray 
Industries, a leading chemical company and the world's largest producer of carbon fibre, 
which had 30 directors throughout the sample period. On average, more than 9 directors out 
of 10 are employees of the firm, which clearly shows that Japanese boards are dominated by 
insiders. In contrast, US boards involve a majority of outside directors (Boone et al., 2007; 
 
 
Coles et al., 2008). Distribution of ownership by company directors is positively skewed (with 
a median of 0.42% and an average of 3.62%) suggesting the application of a log 
transformation.  
Average ROA (about 5.5%) and leverage (about 21.5%) are close to the figures for US 
firms provided by Adams et al. (2005). On the other hand, the average age of Japanese firms 
indicated by the number of years since their listing on the TSE is significantly higher than in 
the US.viii Concerning the two variables used as instruments for board size, average ownership 
by individuals is just over 33% while the average free float is relatively low at 20.6% of 
outstanding shares given the extensive presence of blockholders in the capital of Japanese 
firms (La Porta et al., 1999; Mishra, 2011).  
The results in the lower panel indicate that the absolute deviation from expected ROA 
is only about 1.35% on average, which confirms the low average volatility of ROA. In 
comparison, Sanders and Hambrick (2007) report that the absolute deviation from expected 
ROA for US firms is about 3.72 % on average (which is 2.75 times higher than in Japan).  
 
 RESULTS 
We begin the analysis by testing whether Hypothesis 1 holds in Japan using both cross 
sectional and panel regressions. We then evaluate the role of growth opportunities put forth in 
Hypothesis 2. The last part of this section is devoted to a number of sensitivity checks.  
 
Effect of Board Size on Performance Volatility 
Table 2 presents the cross-sectional regressions using within-firm performance 
variability. Overall, model fit is comparable to the case of US firms.ix Consistent with Cheng 
(2008), board size appears to be associated with lower risk taking. The results based on 
industry-adjusted performance point to a similar conclusion. The coefficient on the proportion 
of inside directors (INDIR) is generally negative, but not highly significant. In line with 
current literature, board ownership does not seem to be associated with a higher propensity to 
take risk (except for ROA volatility where the coefficient is significant at the 10% level). On 
the other hand, the stock option indicator (SO) is associated with significantly higher risk 
taking, particularly for the volatility of ROA and Tobin’s Q. This effect is congruent with the 
findings reported by Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Coles et al. (2006), Wright et al. (2007), 
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) and Low (2009) regarding US firms.x  
 
 
Less anticipated is the negative influence of institutional ownership (significant at the 
1% level for both ROA and stock return volatility) which suggests that Japanese financial 
institutions do not press firms to take more risk (Morck and Nakamura, 1999). This result 
might be due to their dual role as shareholders and creditors.xi The influence of firm size is 
significant and consistently negative which reflects the greater diversification opportunities 
available to large firms. On the other hand, firm age does not appear to produce a similar 
reduction in risk. Consistent with Adams et al. (2005) leverage has a positive effect on the 
volatility of stock returns. In contrast, Cheng (2008) reports that leverage has no impact on 
the volatility of US shares.  
Overall, the impact of board size is economically small. A one standard deviation 
increase in the log of board size is associated with a relatively trivial 0.10% (= 0.0028  
0.3667) decrease in ROA volatility. Yet, this order of magnitude is comparable to the 0.18% 
(= 0.0013  1.38) decrease in ROA volatility resulting from a one standard deviation increase 
in firm size or the 0.11% (= 0.0060  0.183) increase in ROA volatility resulting from a one 
standard deviation increase in leverage. The effect on stock volatility appears to be more 
significant considering the 0.52% (= 0.0141  0.3667) decrease in volatility implied by a 
standard deviation increase in the log of board size. The corresponding impact from firm size 
and leverage are respectively 0.9% and 1.55%. To provide a comparison with US firms, a one 
standard deviation increase in board size can be associated with a 0.0211  0.28 = 0.60% 
decrease in ROA volatility and a 0.0396  0.28 = 1.13% decrease in stock volatility. Thus the 
influence of board size appears to be weaker in Japan.  
A possible explanation for this result is the fact that Japanese boards are much more 
homogenous than US boards. The lesser diversity among Japanese directors implies that 
board size has a smaller impact on the filtering of corporate decisions. A completely different 
explanation is to point out the lack of significant cross sectional variation in risk taking 
among Japanese firms. Indeed, the statistics reported in Table 1 show that the standard 
deviation in ROA volatility is 1.72% while the standard deviation in stock return volatility is 
3.82%. In comparison, Wright et al. (2007) reveal that the standard deviation in ROA 
volatility is 8.2% in the US. The standard deviation in the volatility of US stock returns is also 
much higher at 21.6%. Without significant variation in the dependent variable(s), the 
explanatory variables are bound to lack statistical power.  
To show that this interpretation is valid, we use quantile regressions.xii The objective is 
to differentiate the effect of board size at different points of the conditional distribution of the 
 
 
dependent variable. In this respect, we choose the 75th quantile to represent high-risk firms 
and the 25th quantile to represent low-risk firms. The results presented in Table 3 show that 
the negative effect of board size is more significant when firms exhibit a high ROA volatility. 
In fact, the effect of board size at the 75th quantile is almost twice as large relative to the effect 
at the mean (using OLS). In contrast, the effect at the 25th quantile is small and statistically 
insignificant. The difference estimated using inter-quantile regression is significant at the 10% 
level. This suggests that the low volatility of ROA in Japan might be responsible for the small 
effect of board size. Focusing on the behavior of more risky firms reveals that board size is 
not only important, but also the most significant factor explaining the volatility of ROA. The 
results are similar using stock return volatility. The effect of board size at the 75th quantile is 
about two times the effect at the 25th quantile. The effect of firm size and leverage is also 
more significant for high-risk firms.  
 
Deviation from Expected Performance 
Our second step is to run Glejser (1969) heteroskedasticity tests on annual (for ROA 
and Tobin’s Q) and monthly (for stock returns) panels of performance volatility measures. 
Following Adams et al. (2005) and Sanders and Hambrick (2007) for nonfinancial firms and 
Pathan (2009) for bank holding companies, firm effects are assumed to be randomly 
distributed and the standard errors are clustered by firm. As already mentioned, using panel 
regressions with firm fixed effects would require either a greater rate of change in board size 
or a longer period of observation in order to allow board size to change over that time as in 
Lehn et al. (2009) where observations are made every 5 years.  
The regression results are presented in Table 4. For ROA and LNQ, risk is measured 
by the absolute deviation from predicted ROA and LNQ using equations 2-3. For stock 
returns, we use the CAPM and Fama French (FF) three-factor model described in equation 4. 
The residual does not include the firm effect which is assumed to be part of the firm’s 
predicted performance. Consistent with our cross-sectional findings, board size is negatively 
associated with all the risk taking measures. However the impact is small and not highly 
significant, except for the volatility of stock returns. The results also indicate that firm size is 
associated with lower risk, consistent with greater diversification benefits. Older firms are 
also characterized by lower risk, but only for ROA and Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, the 
higher risk arising from the use of financial leverage is only significant when risk is measured 
by the unexpected deviation of stock returns from the CAPM and Fama-French models.  
 
 
 
The Moderating Role of Growth Opportunities 
Although the above results provide some support for Hypothesis 1, the effect of board 
size is not statistically significant across all the risk measures and not as strong as in Cheng 
(2008). The argument expressed in Hypothesis 2 is that the influence of board size is not 
homogenous across all firms. To investigate whether there is a difference between firms with 
plenty of growth opportunities and firms with few good investments available, we split the 
sample using Tobin’s Q. Firms with poor investment opportunities are identified by a ratio 
below the sample’s median. Table 5 displays the results of the cross sectional (OLS) 
regressions. For high growth firms, larger boards do not seem to be associated with a 
statistically significant lower risk, except using stock return volatility. On the other hand, 
larger boards are found to sharply decrease the risk of firms with few investment 
opportunities. In fact, the (negative) slope appears to be about 50 percent steeper for each of 
the volatility measures. It can also be noted that despite the lower significance of board size, 
model fit tends to be better for high-Q firms with a stronger moderating effect on risk 
stemming from firm size.  
To further highlight the role of growth options, we perform Glejser heteroskedasticity 
tests on a split sample using the median Tobin’s Q updated each year to identify firms with 
poor investment opportunities. The results presented in Table 6 indicate that larger boards do 
not significantly affect risk taking provided that firms have plenty of investment opportunities. 
In contrast, if firms have few good investments available, board size seems to affect the 
outcome of the screening process, thus leading to much smaller deviation from expected 
performance. Although not strongly significant, the coefficient on board size for low-Q firms 
is always lower (i.e. with a steeper downward slope) than the coefficient for the pooled 
sample. The other covariates are similar to those appearing in Table 3. Firm size is associated 
with a lower risk of deviating from expected performance particularly for high-Q firms. Firm 
age has a similar impact on ROA and firm value, but no influence on stock returns, while the 
leverage ratio only has an influence on the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns.  
 
Robustness Checks 
Our first concern is to ensure that the results related to Hypothesis 2 are robust to 
alternative measures of investment opportunities. Using industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, we find 
estimates similar to those shown in Tables 5 and 6. These results are not tabulated to save 
 
 
space. We then use a more distinct proxy for investment opportunities: average sales growth. 
Although the difference between high and low growth firms is not as significant, the results 
presented in Table 7 confirm that board size is associated with lower risk taking particularly 
when firms are characterised by low growth opportunities.  
Our second concern is that the results regarding both hypotheses could be driven by 
the endogeneity of board size. For instance, high-risk firms may prefer to operate with smaller 
boards because it allows them to make quicker decisions in response to unexpected events. It 
may also be harder to find qualified directors in high risk sectors. Conversely, board positions 
in low risk firms may be more attractive for directors who anticipate they will be able to 
discharge their duty without suffering from undue stress. Incompetence is also easier to 
conceal in a low risk environment. If that case, OLS regressions will overestimate the 
negative impact of board size on the firm’s risk taking. On the other hand, if high-risk firms 
require more expertise to handle the associated risk (Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008), 
they will tend to operate with larger boards. In that case, OLS estimates will underestimate 
the negative influence of board size on a firm’s risk taking. 
To partially mitigate this concern, we follow Cheng (2008) and substitute the first 
observation of board size to its average in the cross sectional regressions. All the estimates are 
found to be negative but somewhat smaller. For instance, the coefficient for ROA volatility is 
-0.0016 (compared to -0.0028) and the coefficient for stock volatility is -0.0112 (compared to 
-0.0141). These results are not tabulated to save space. Instead, we present the results of 
instrumental variable regressions. The effectiveness of this approach critically depends on the 
availability of valid instruments. In our case, we use the percentage of the firm’s free float.xiii  
This variable is likely to be a valid instrument because of its high correlation with 
board size and its low correlation with the unexplained variation in risk taking (for each of the 
risk taking proxies). The first assertion (high correlation with the endogenous regressor) can 
easily be tested by looking at the significance of the instrument in the board size (or first 
stage) regression. Furthermore, there is a compelling reason to expect firms with a larger free 
float to have smaller boards. In essence, it’s because these shares are either held by small 
investors or by financial institutions for a trading purpose. In both cases, free float shares are 
unlikely to involve board representation. On the contrary, investors making a strategic 
investment are likely to trade off the loss of liquidity on their shares for a seat (or 
representation) on the board. The second assertion (absence of correlation with the error term) 
cannot be tested econometrically because we only have one instrument for one endogenous 
regressor (board size). However, there is no reason to suspect that the percentage of shares in 
 
 
the free float might affect the firm’s risk taking beyond what the other exogenous variables 
already explain. In particular, while a large free float might potentially affect the firm’s 
governance (and risk taking) by allowing other types of investor to exercise their influence, 
the incremental effect is likely to be trivial since we already control for the influence of 
institutional investors in the risk taking (second stage) regressions. In any case, the strength of 
the instrument ensures that the 2SLS results are less biased relative to the OLS estimates 
(Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  
Table 8 presents the results of the 2SLS regressions. The first-stage which is common 
to the three risk measures indicates that the excluded instrument is reasonably significant and 
has the predicted negative effect on board size. The F-value (9.06) is slightly above the 
critical level (8.96) suggested by Stock et al. (2002). Higher ownership by financial 
institutions also appears to be associated with larger boards, consistent with their more active 
role in Japan. The second-stage results suggest that board size plays almost no role in the 
firm’s risk taking, except for return volatility where the effect is only significant at the 10% 
level. These results seem to contradict our previous findings. However, the Durbin and Wu-
Hausman exogeneity tests show that the difference with the OLS estimates is actually 
insignificant. This suggests that the OLS estimates are not seriously biased and should thus be 
preferred because of their greater efficiency (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).   
Lastly, we consider bankruptcy indicators as substitute measures of risk taking.xiv The 
results presented in Table 9 continue to support our two hypotheses. The coefficient on board 
size is significantly negative for both bankruptcy indicators, and more so for firms with low 
growth opportunities. This difference is most evident for the Z-score. Among the other 
regressors, higher proportion of inside directors is associated with lower risk, suggesting 
concern for the safety of their human capital (May, 1995; Holmstrom, 1999). High 
institutional ownership is also found to be associated with lower risk, consistent with its 
negative effect on performance variability. On the other hand, higher leverage significantly 
increases the risk of bankruptcy while its effect on performance variability is relatively weak 
(except for stock returns).  
 
CONCLUSION 
The greater difficulty to reach consensus in large decision-making groups suggests 
that large boards are associated with lower risk taking. But, the inability to take risks can 
prevent firms from making the most of their available opportunities, which ultimately harms 
 
 
their performance. In line with this idea, Yermack (1996) presents evidence that firms with 
larger boards exhibit lower market valuations. However, the recent findings of Coles et al. 
(2008) reveal that large boards are not necessarily detrimental to firm performance. The 
intuition is that the marginal value of a board member depends on the firm’s characteristics. 
When a firm requires more expertise, bringing an additional director to the board may not 
decrease the firm’s value despite the higher coordination costs associated with a larger board. 
But when these conditions are not met, the higher coordination costs are likely to outweigh 
any marginal benefit that a director can add to the firm. In that case, larger boards can only 
decrease firm value.  
In this paper, we have related the above results to corporate risk taking. Our main 
argument is that when a firm has plenty of investment opportunities, a larger board may not 
necessarily reduce the firm’s ability to select risky projects. Although a greater number of 
projects are likely to be eliminated, there will still be enough risky projects to make their way 
through the board’s selection process. Hence, that firm should be able to implement a 
sufficient number of good investments which will ultimately contribute to its higher value. On 
the other hand, if the firm has few investment opportunities, putting them to the approval of a 
large board will greatly reduce the number of risky projects being retained. Since there are 
few alternative projects to replace those rejected by the board, the firm’s risk taking is likely 
to decrease along with its market value.  
Using a low Tobin’s Q (or a low sales growth) to identify poor investment 
opportunities, we found that performance variability falls significantly when firms operate 
with larger boards. The relation is comparatively weaker and often insignificant when firms 
have plenty of growth opportunities. These results which extend those of Cheng (2008) are 
robust to the performance indicator used for measuring risk and appear in the cross section as 
well as in panel data. To address endogeneity concerns, we have used an instrumental variable 
approach. The variation in board size unrelated to the unexplained component of risk-taking is 
isolated by using information contained in the distribution of the firm’s ownership. The 
coefficient estimates are found to be generally larger. However, according to exogeneity tests, 
the different with OLS estimates is not significant.  
Overall, the results highlight the importance of decision making processes. Consistent 
with the arguments of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) firms need to adapt their 
governance structures to their operating environment. In the context of this paper, the 
implication is that firms should adjust the size of their boards to the quality of their 
investment opportunity sets. Ignoring this principle is likely to affect the firm’s decisions, 
 
 
resulting in lower performance. In particular, by maintaining large boards in an environment 
characterized by decreasing investment opportunities, Japanese firms may hinder their ability 
to make bold decisions. This in turn could affect their future growth considering the positive 
link between risk taking and subsequent increases in sales documented by John et al. (2008). 
Over the last decade, Japanese firms have moved in the right direction by dramatically 
reducing the size of their boards to make them comparable to US boards. It is hard to fathom 
that, not long ago, these boards used to consist of around 28 directors (Basu et al., 2007). For 
instance, Sony Corp. had 38 directors before it decided to trim its board to just 10 members. It 
is likely that these cumbersome decision making structures have prevented Japanese firms to 
react swiftly and purposefully to the growing threat of nimbler competitors. Their now 
considerably smaller board sizes should help them make more audacious decisions and regain 
their lost competitive advantages.  
Nonetheless, more progress is still needed. A significant step would be to increase the 
diversity of profiles in the boardroom, as well as in the executive ranks, since the generation 
of ideas and innovative projects is unlikely to fit well with the uniformity of profiles that 
typifies today’s corporate boards in Japan. But this change will only come if firms abandon 
their practice of picking up their managers through internal tournaments. A deeper external 
labour market for executive talent is also required to offer firms with credible alternatives to 
fill their upper management positions. Similarly, the practice of requiring women to choose 
between motherhood and career has contributed to squash gender diversity in top 
management layers to the point that only 3% of Japanese firms have female directors. In brief, 
a comprehensive solution to Japan’s well-documented deficit in corporate risk taking (John et 
al., 2008; Griffin et al. 2009; Acharya et al. 2011) is likely to involve more than just a 
reduction in board size.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std dev Q1 Median Q3 
      
Panel A: cross sectional data (N = 1,324 firms)
   
Standard deviation of performance: 
ROA (in %) 1.85 1.72 0.76 1.29 2.35 
LNQ (×100) 15.29 12.31 7.54 12.31 18.59 
Return (in %) 9.42 3.82 6.80 8.67 11.05 
      
Standard deviation of industry-adjusted performance:
ROA (in %) 1.76 1.58 0.78 1.26 2.18 
LNQ (×100) 12.51 11.07 6.25 9.39 15.30 
Return (in %) 8.15 3.30 6.05 7.38 9.34 
   
Average board, ownership and firm characteristics:
BS (number of directors) 10.41 4.59 7.00 9.00 12.00 
ln(BS) 2.25 0.37 1.99 2.24 2.49 
INDIR  0.93 0.11 0.89 1.00 1.00 
SO 0.33 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DIROWN (% of shares) 3.62 7.73 0.13 0.42 2.56 
INST (% of shares) 22.36 14.50 10.27 19.21 32.25 
ROA (in %) 5.49 4.76 2.71 4.73 7.50 
Tobin’s Q 1.37 1.13 1.01 1.17 1.43 
LNTA 11.73 1.38 10.79 11.49 12.48 
CAPEX (% of total assets) 4.85 7.15 1.58 3.32 5.98 
DEBT (% of total assets) 21.52 18.26 5.21 18.42 33.44 
AGE 35.17 19.03 16.00 43.00 55.00 
INDIV (% of shares) 33.04 15.73 21.02 31.25 42.84 
FLOAT (% of shares) 20.64 11.18 11.67 18.94 28.27 
 
Panel B: panel data (N = 6,399 firm-year or 76,717 firm-month observations) 
      
Absolute deviation from expected performance 
ROA (in %) 1.31 1.59 0.36 0.81 1.65 
LNQ (×100) 9.32 10.90 2.83 6.45 12.09 
Return using CAPM (in %) 6.01 6.62 1.97 4.35 7.96 
Return using Fama French (in %) 5.71 6.22 1.89 4.15 7.58 
 
In Panel A, standard deviations are calculated over the period 2003-2007. The other variables are 
averaged over the same period. ROA is operating income over total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market to 
book value of assets. LNQ is the natural log of Q. Monthly stock returns are adjusted for dividends 
and stock splits. Industry-adjusted performance is computed by subtracting the industry median. 
LNTA is the log of total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures over sales. DEBT is total debt over 
total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. BS is the number of directors. INDIR 
is the proportion of insiders. SO indicates that the firm has issued stock options. DIROWN is the 
percentage of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial institutions. INDIV is 
the percentage of shares held by individual shareholders. FLOAT is the free-float. In panel B, absolute 
deviation is relative to expected performance described in equations 2-4. Financial data is from Nikkei 
AMSUS. Board and shareholding data is from Nikkei CGES.  
   
 
 
Table 2: Relation between board size and risk taking using cross sectional data 
 
 Standard deviation of performance   Std deviation of industry-adjusted performance
 ROA LNQ Return ROA LNQ Return
          
Ln(BS) -0.0028 † -0.0154  -0.0141 **  -0.0030 * -0.0146 † -0.0106 **
  (-1.95)   (-1.55)  (-5.00)   (-2.33)   (-1.65)  (-4.31)  
INDIR 0.0017  -0.0217  -0.0097 †  -0.0004  -0.0128  -0.0089 †
 (0.57)  (-1.08)  (-1.77)   (-0.14)  (-0.71)  (-1.89)  
SO 0.0038 ** 0.0289 ** -0.0004   0.0033 ** 0.0204 ** -0.0005  
 (3.58)  (4.19)  (-0.22)   (3.43)  (3.27)  (-0.30)  
Ln(DIROWN) 0.0013 † 0.0013  0.0012   0.0012 † 0.0015  0.0011  
 (1.72)  (0.30)  (0.87)   (1.79)  (0.37)  (0.91)  
INST -0.0001 ** -0.0004  -0.0003 **  -0.0002 ** -0.0004  -0.0003 **
 (-2.72)  (-1.07)  (-3.26)   (-3.73)  (-1.22)  (-3.70)  
LNTA -0.0013 ** -0.0120 ** -0.0065 **  -0.0012 ** -0.0071 * -0.0059 **
 (-2.91)  (-3.43)  (-7.55)   (-2.99)  (-2.27)  (-7.83)  
CAPEX -0.0086  0.1563 * -0.0221   -0.0021  0.1303 * -0.0028  
 (-1.26)  (2.17)  (-0.98)   (-0.35)  (2.16)  (-0.14)  
DEBT 0.0060 * -0.0890 ** 0.0853 **  0.0044  -0.0368 * 0.0671 **
 (2.02)  (-4.69)  (13.88)   (1.61)  (-2.18)  (12.51)  
AGE -0.0030  -0.0074  0.0176 *  -0.0028  -0.0517 * 0.0062  
 (-0.90)  (-0.30)  (2.36)   (-0.92)  (-2.34)  (0.93)  
          
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
      
F value 10.56 ** 10.99 ** 39.03 **  12.56 ** 8.84 ** 33.36 **
R2 0.193   0.1794  0.3498   0.1996  0.1695  0.3119  
 
The sample consists of 1,324 firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2007 with available board information in the Nikkei CGES 
database. Performance variability is calculated over the sample period. ROA is operating income over total assets. LNQ is the log of market to book value of 
assets. Stock returns are adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Industry-adjusted performance is obtained by subtracting the industry’s median performance. 
All the explanatory variables are averaged. BS is the number of directors. INDIR is the proportion of insiders. SO indicates that the firm has issued stock 
options. DIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. CAPEX 
is capital expenditures over total assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. **, *, † indicate that the t-ratios between brackets are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
Table 3: Conditional effect on risk taking at different quantiles  
 
 Standard deviation of ROA   Std deviation of stock returns
 .75 Qtile .25 Qtile .75 - .25 .75 Qtile .25 Qtile .75 - .25
          
Ln(BS) -0.0051 ** -0.0013  -0.0038 †  -0.0149 ** -0.0078 ** -0.0071 †
  (-2.88)  (-1.46)  (-1.93)   (-3.20)  (-2.65)  (-1.78)  
INDIR -0.0012  0.0003  -0.0015   -0.0071  -0.0053  -0.0018  
 (-0.42)  (0.24)  (-0.44)   (-0.76)  (-0.89)  (-0.20)  
SO 0.0038 * 0.0012  0.0026   -0.0007  0.0023  -0.0030  
 (2.23)  (1.28)  (1.61)   (-0.27)  (1.11)  (-1.19)  
Ln(DIROWN) 0.0011  -0.0001  0.0012 †  0.0001  0.0007  -0.0007  
 (1.21)  (-0.19)  (1.75)   (0.05)  (0.72)  (-0.37)  
INST -0.0001 † 0.0000  -0.0001   -0.0004 * 0.0001  -0.0004 **
 (-1.69)  (-0.66)  (-1.23)   (-2.58)  (0.92)  (-3.57)  
LNTA -0.0011 † -0.0003  -0.0007   -0.0071 ** -0.0029 ** -0.0042 **
 (-1.85)  (-0.93)  (-1.58)   (-5.41)  (-3.24)  (-3.38)  
CAPEX -0.0111  -0.0027  -0.0084   -0.0131  -0.0372 † 0.0241  
 (-1.09)  (-0.86)  (-0.79)   (-0.41)  (-1.93)  (0.77)  
DEBT 0.0070 * 0.0015  0.0055   0.0905 ** 0.0573 ** 0.0332 **
 (2.06)  (0.73)  (1.14)   (11.33)  (11.08)  (3.67)  
AGE -0.0061  -0.0044 ** -0.0017   0.0118  0.0008  0.0110  
 (-1.56)  (-2.97)  (-0.39)   (1.33)  (0.10)  (1.08)  
          
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Pseudo R2 0.1524  0.0828  N.A.  0.249  0.1654 N.A.  
 
The sample consists of 1,324 firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2007 with available board information in the Nikkei CGES 
database. Performance variability is calculated over the sample period. ROA is operating income over total assets. LNQ is the log of market to book value of 
assets. Stock returns are adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Industry-adjusted performance is obtained by subtracting the industry’s median performance. 
All the explanatory variables are averaged. BS is the number of directors. INDIR is the proportion of insiders. SO indicates that the firm has issued stock 
options. DIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. CAPEX 
is capital expenditures over total assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. The equations are estimated 
using quantile regressions with bootstrapped standard errors involving 50 replications. **, *, † indicate that the t-ratios between brackets are significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Relation between board size and risk taking using panel data 
 
  Absolute deviation from expected performance using 
  ROA LNQ  CAPM  Fama-French 
        
Ln(BS) -0.0013   -0.0094 † -0.4972 ** -0.3815 ** 
  (-1.58)   (-1.85)  (-3.55)  (-2.87)   
INDIR -0.0003  -0.0120  -0.0241  0.0852  
 (-0.31)  (-1.50)  (-0.11)  (0.43)  
SO 0.0019 ** 0.0067 † -0.1640 † -0.1327  
 (2.91)  (1.89)  (-1.72)  (-1.46)  
Ln(DIROWN) -0.0001  0.0010  0.0437  0.0732  
 (-0.10)  (0.34)  (0.63)  (1.14)  
INST -0.0084 * 0.0055  -0.0126 * -0.0076 † 
 (-2.38)   (0.33)  (-2.55)  (-1.66)  
LNTA -0.0012 ** -0.0042 † -0.3765 ** -0.3214 ** 
 (-3.88)  (-1.93)  (-7.61)  (-6.67)  
CAPEX -0.0022  -0.0085  -0.0002  0.0027  
 (-0.68)  (-0.28)  (-0.03)  (0.29)  
DEBT 0.0021  -0.0161  0.0488 ** 0.0409 ** 
 (1.11)  (-0.86)  (12.63)  (11.63)  
AGE -0.0057 * -0.0411 * 0.0002  -0.0021  
 (-2.24)  (-2.50)  (0.05)  (-0.59)  
       
Industry and year 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Wald test 388.28 ** 394.92 ** 2170.58 ** 1775.41 ** 
R2  0.121   0.081  0.0655  0.057   
 
Expected performance is described in equations 2-4. Absolute deviation from expected performance is 
the absolute value of the residual described in equation 5. ROA is operating income over total assets. 
LNQ is the log of market to book value of assets. BS is the number of directors. INDIR is the 
proportion of insiders. SO indicates that the firm has issued stock options. DIROWN is the percentage 
of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial institutions. LNTA is the log of 
total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures over total assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. AGE 
is the number of years since the firm’s listing. The sample for ROA and LNQ consists of 6,399 firm-
year observations. The sample for stock returns consists of 76,717 firm-month observations. The 
equations are estimated using GLS random effects with standard errors clustered by firm. **, *, † 
indicate that the z-values in brackets are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
Table 5: Effect of growth opportunities on the relation between board size and risk taking (OLS regressions) 
 
 Std deviation of ROA Std deviation of LNQ Std deviation of Return
 Low Q High Q Low Q High Q Low Q High Q
         
Ln(BS) -0.0028 † -0.0018  -0.0174 * -0.0100   -0.0178 ** -0.0102 **
 (-1.86)   (-0.80)  (-1.99)  (-0.65)   (-3.93)  (-2.88)  
INDIR 0.0046  -0.0012  -0.0119  -0.0361  -0.0045  -0.0141 †
 (1.13)  (-0.29)  (-0.59)  (-1.16)  (-0.55)  (-1.91)  
SO 0.0026 † 0.0035 * 0.0125 * 0.0201 † -0.0014  -0.0029  
 (1.82)  (2.25)  (2.00)  (1.91)  (-0.47)  (-1.17)  
Ln(DIROWN) 0.0015 † 0.0010  0.0016  -0.0001  0.0033  -0.0005  
 (1.84)  (0.82)  (0.50)  (-0.01)  (1.58)  (-0.28)  
INST -0.0001  -0.0002 ** 0.0000  -0.0009 † -0.0002  -0.0004 **
 (-1.02)  (-3.06)  (0.08)  (-1.71)  (-1.36)  (-3.30)  
LNTA -0.0012 * -0.0021 ** -0.0055  -0.0208 ** -0.0044 ** -0.0089 **
 (-2.30)  (-3.30)  (-1.43)  (-4.23)  (-3.32)  (-7.73)  
CAPEX -0.0147  -0.0145 † 0.0819  0.1483 † -0.0741 ** -0.0079  
 (-1.04)  (-1.86)  (0.97)  (1.70)  (-4.65)  (-0.32)  
DEBT -0.0005  0.0074  -0.1032 ** -0.1122 ** 0.0821 ** 0.0808 **
 (-0.15)  (1.55)  (-4.86)  (-3.53)  (10.49)  (8.51)  
AGE -0.0040  -0.0005  -0.0162  0.0187  0.0185 † 0.0193 †
 (-1.05)  (-0.10)  (-0.89)  (0.45)  (1.76)  (1.89)  
         
Industry dummies Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  
     
F value 6.07 ** 9.08 ** 6.43 ** 8.03 ** 17.7 ** 27.02 **
R2 0.2087   0.2201   0.1524  0.2157    0.3432  0.4285  
The sample consists of 1,324 firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 2003-2007 with available board information in the Nikkei CGES database. 
Performance variability is calculated over the sample period. ROA is operating income over total assets. LNQ is the log of market to book value of assets. Stock returns are 
adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Low Q (High Q) indicates that the firm’s average Q ratio is below (above) the sample median. All the explanatory variables are 
averaged over the sample period. BS is the number of board members. INDIR is the proportion of insiders. SO indicates that the firm has issued stock options. DIROWN is 
the percentage of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures over total 
assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. **, *, † indicate that the t-
ratios between brackets are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of growth opportunities on the relation between board size and risk taking (panel regressions) 
 
 Absolute deviation from expected performance using 
 ROA LNQ  CAPM Fama French model 
 Low Q High Q Low Q High Q Low Q High Q Low Q High Q
  
Ln(BS) -0.0020 * -0.0001  -0.0118 * -0.0071  -0.7697 ** -0.3951 * -0.6130 ** -0.3080 †
 (-2.27)   (-0.08)  (-2.39)  (-0.87)  (-3.85)  (-2.23)  (-3.37)  (-1.75)  
INDIR 0.0001  -0.0008  -0.0054  -0.0233 † 0.1181  -0.4038  0.3498  -0.4151  
 (0.10)  (-0.46)  (-0.75)  (-1.71)  (0.38)  (-1.43)  (1.25)  (-1.53)  
SO 0.0011 † 0.0020 † 0.0031  0.0023  -0.3535 ** -0.0121  -0.3115 * -0.0012  
 (1.68)  (1.90)  (1.04)  (0.39)  (-2.78)  (-0.10)  (-2.54)  (-0.01)  
Ln(DIROWN) 0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0009  0.0010  -0.0333  0.0053  0.0124  0.0365  
 (0.67)  (-0.51)  (-0.35)  (0.19)  (-0.32)  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.46)  
INST -0.0029   -0.0166 ** -0.0056  -0.0119  -0.0121 † -0.0250 ** -0.0102 † -0.0176 ** 
 (-0.59)   (-3.73)  (-0.42)  (-0.41)  (-1.72)  (-3.93)  (-1.73)  (-2.91)  
LNTA -0.0013 ** -0.0017 ** -0.0004  -0.0097 ** -0.2633 ** -0.5734 ** -0.1652 ** -0.5378 ** 
 (-3.10)  (-3.72)  (-0.22)  (-2.97)  (-4.07)  (-9.25)  (-2.83)  (-8.80)  
CAPEX -0.0045  -0.0025  -0.0337  -0.0032  -0.0200 † 0.0116  -0.0201 * 0.0158  
 (-0.59)  (-0.70)  (-1.55)  (-0.07)  (-1.95)  (0.91)  (-2.11)  (1.32)  
DEBT 0.0044 † -0.0033  0.0143  -0.0642 ** 0.0530 ** 0.0457 ** 0.0449 ** 0.0375 ** 
 (1.67)  (-1.20)  (0.49)  (-3.33)  (9.50)  (9.68)  (9.44)  (8.54)  
AGE -0.0045  -0.0047  -0.0350 ** -0.0269  -0.0019  0.0083 † -0.0053  0.0066  
 (-1.47)  (-1.19)  (-2.72)  (-0.96)  (-0.38)  (1.65)  (-1.18)  (1.37)  
   
Industry and time 
dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald 2 210.91 ** 248.87 ** 211.24 ** 600.99 ** 1305.44 ** 1409.57 ** 1088.29 ** 1202.85 ** 
R2 0.1323   0.1251  0.0616  0.0961  0.0693  0.0754  0.0581  0.069  
 
Expected performance is described in equations 2-4. Absolute deviation from expected performance is the absolute value of the residual described in equation 5. ROA 
is operating income over total assets. LNQ is the log of market to book value of assets. Excess returns are relative to the CAPM or Fama-French 3-factor model. Low 
Q (high Q) indicates that the firm’s Q ratio is below (above) the sample median in the same year. BS is the number of directors. INDIR is the proportion of inside 
directors. SO indicates that the firm has distributed stock options. DIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial 
institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. CAPEX are capital expenditures over total assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. AGE is the number of years since 
the firm’s listing. The sample for ROA and LNQ consists of 6,399 firm-year observations. The sample for stock returns consists of 76,717 firm-month observations. 
The equations are estimated using GLS random effects with standard errors clustered by firm. **, *, † indicate that the z-values in brackets are significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Effect of growth opportunities using sales growth (OLS regressions) 
 
Dependent variable Volatility of ROA  Volatility of LNQ  Volatility of Returns
 Low SG High SG Low SG High SG Low SG High SG
           
Predicted ln(BS) -0.0026   -0.0025   -0.0161 † -0.0117   -0.0142 ** -0.0114 **
 (-1.49)   (-1.13)   (-1.71)  (-0.77)   (-3.34)  (-3.16)  
INDIR 0.0021  0.0011   -0.0251  -0.0345   -0.0049  -0.0142 †
 (0.60)  (0.23)   (-1.41)  (-1.11)   (-0.62)  (-1.95)  
SO 0.0032 * 0.0033 *  0.0173 * 0.0239 *  -0.0020  -0.0013  
 (2.26)  (2.18)   (2.37)  (2.30)   (-0.71)  (-0.52)  
Ln(DIROWN) 0.0018 † 0.0002   -0.0014  -0.0068   -0.0016  0.0017  
 (1.96)  (0.19)   (-0.35)  (-0.93)   (-0.87)  (0.95)  
INST -0.0001  -0.0002 *  -0.0001  -0.0006   -0.0002  -0.0004 **
 (-1.63)  (-2.51)   (-0.31)  (-1.16)   (-1.45)  (-3.23)  
LNTA -0.0014 ** -0.0015 *  -0.0069 * -0.0212 **  -0.0061 ** -0.0074 **
 (-2.65)  (-2.13)   (-2.36)  (-3.82)   (-5.24)  (-6.07)  
CAPEX -0.0129  -0.0114   0.0862  0.1821   -0.0352  -0.0088  
 (-1.08)  (-1.28)   (1.21)  (1.64)   (-1.30)  (-0.29)  
DEBT 0.0079 * 0.0068   -0.0660 ** -0.0965 **  0.0861 ** 0.0852 **
 (1.97)  (1.40)   (-3.67)  (-2.63)   (9.92)  (9.38)  
AGE -0.0044  0.0010   -0.0123  0.0244   0.0221 * 0.0183 †
 (-1.02)  (0.18)   (-0.50)  (0.60)   (2.12)  (1.70)  
           
Industry dummies Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
           
F value 5.89 ** 4.93 **  6.50 ** 4.52 **  22.48 ** 20.08 **
R2 0.1959   0.1939   0.2208  0.1881    0.3706  0.3736  
 
Growth opportunities are estimated using average sales growth (SG) over the sample period. Low SG (High SG) indicates that the firm’s average sales growth 
is below (above) the sample median. The variables are the same as in Table 4. The sample consists of 1,324 firm observations. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. **, *, † indicate that the t-ratios between brackets are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
Table 8: Instrumental variable regressions 
 
  
Ln(BS) 
Standard deviation of performance 
  ROA  LNQ  Return   
       
Predicted ln(BS)   0.0247  0.0801  -0.0710 † 
   (1.22)  (0.59)  (-1.71)   
FLOAT -0.0024 **     
 (-3.01)       
INDIR -0.5658 ** 0.0175  0.0330  -0.0422 † 
 (-11.62)  (1.48)  (0.41)  (-1.73)  
SO -0.0573 ** 0.0054 ** 0.0345 ** -0.0037  
 (-2.78)  (3.65)  (3.43)  (-1.16)  
Ln(DIROWN) -0.0050  0.0020 * 0.0038  -0.0003  
 (-0.37)  (2.03)  (0.70)  (-0.17)  
INST 0.0025 ** -0.0002 * -0.0007  -0.0001  
 (2.82)  (-2.57)  (-1.18)  (-0.67)  
LNTA 0.1252 ** -0.0050 † -0.0248  0.0011  
 (14.49)  (-1.83)  (-1.41)  (0.20)  
CAPEX -0.3519 * -0.0007  0.1839 * -0.0386  
 (-2.53)  (-0.07)  (2.29)  (-1.44)  
DEBT 0.0291  0.0064 † -0.0876 ** 0.0845 ** 
 (0.48)  (1.95)  (-4.41)  (12.59)  
AGE -0.0510  -0.0004  0.0016  0.0122  
 (-0.76)  (-0.10)  (0.06)  (1.41)  
      
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
F test (instrument) 9.0579 **     
Partial R2 0.0073      
Durbin 2   2.3474  0.5384  2.2666 
Wu-Hausman F value   2.3123  0.5244  2.1953 
       
F value (model) 30.38 **     
Wald 2   226.69 ** 398.02 ** 561.46 ** 
R2 0.3714   0.1224  0.1202  0.1583   
 
The exogenous variation in board size (BS) is identified using the percentage of free float (FLOAT). 
INDIR is the proportion of inside directors. SO indicates that the firm has distributed stock options. 
DIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial 
institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. CAPEX are capital expenditures over total assets. DEBT 
is total debt over total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. **, *, † indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The 
Durbin 2 and Wu-Hausman F test the exogeneity of board size.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Relation between board size and risk taking using bankruptcy risk (panel regressions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olson’s O-score and Altman’s Z score are calculated according to Xu and Zhang (2009). BS is the number of directors. INDIR is the proportion of inside directors. 
SO indicates that the firm has distributed stock options. DIROWN is the percentage of shares owned by all directors. INST is the ownership by financial institutions. 
LNTA is the log of total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures over total assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s 
listing. The equations are estimated using GLS random effects with standard errors clustered by firm. **, *, † indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Olson’s O-score Altman’s Z score (inversed)
  all firms  low Q  high Q  all firms  low Q  high Q  
    
Ln(BS) -0.1664 ** -0.2035 ** -0.1398 ** -0.0244 ** -0.0289 ** -0.0160
(-4.45)  (-3.51) (-2.94) (-3.04)  (-2.74) (-1.40)
INDIR -0.1530 * -0.1999 * -0.0983 -0.0359 ** -0.0640 ** -0.0084
(-2.51)  (-2.07) (-1.32) (-3.04)  (-3.21) (-0.60)
SO 0.0371  0.0581 0.0441 -0.0180 * -0.0192 -0.0114
(1.33)  (1.31) (1.31) (-2.50)  (-1.65) (-1.44)
Ln(DIROWN) 0.0155  0.0360 -0.0004 0.0018  0.0073 -0.0069
(0.86)  (1.31) (-0.02) (0.27)  (0.76) (-1.27)
INST -0.7488 ** -0.5782 ** -0.8919 ** -0.1752 ** -0.2308 † -0.1375 **
(-6.06)  (-3.09) (-5.33) (-2.99)  (-1.79) (-3.41)
LNTA -0.0428 ** -0.0500 * -0.0292 0.0567 * 0.1071 0.0303 **
(-3.17)  (-2.44) (-1.60) (2.32)  (1.57) (4.92)
CAPEX -0.3567 * -0.5339 † -0.2133 0.0521  0.0932 0.1161
(-2.23)  (-1.89) (-1.14) (0.54)  (0.42) (1.56)
DEBT 0.3598 ** 0.4932 ** 0.3076 * 0.4926 ** 0.2783 0.6023 **
(3.69)  (3.60) (2.13) (5.38)  (1.20) (15.02)
AGE 0.0691  -0.0520 0.1158 0.3031 ** 0.4647 * 0.1525 **
(0.68)  (-0.39) (0.76) (2.84)  (2.37) (2.92)
industry and year dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes
     
Wald 2 836.64 ** 505.58 ** 582.77 ** 1565.87 ** 880.6 ** 2428.27 **
R2 0.1347  0.1463 0.1428 0.3191  0.3126 0.6194
 
 
Figure 1: Effect of board size on corporate risk taking  
 
 
 
The following assumptions are made: Firm 1 and firm 2 have the same number of projects. 
Firm 3 has twice as many projects. Firm 2 and firm 3 have twice the number of directors of 
firm 1. Projects for firms 1 and 2 are screened by the entire board. Projects for firm 3 are 
screened by half of the board so that each director screens the same number of projects as the 
directors of firm 1.  
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
 
i The combination of poor investment opportunities and large corporate boards might explain why Japanese 
firms have been found to be significantly less risky than US firms. For more detail, see John et al. (2008).  
ii One implication of this heterogeneity is illustrated by the study of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) which showed 
that dividend increases essentially affect the value of low-Q firms, but have no particular impact on the value of 
high-Q firms.  
iii The same idea applies to portfolio diversification. As more stocks are randomly included in a portfolio, the risk 
of the portfolio decreases towards a minimum representing un-diversifiable risk. But if the stocks included in the 
portfolio are highly correlated, the risk of the portfolio will not decrease much although a large number of stocks 
appear to have been included in the portfolio.  
iv Note that in contrast to Adams et al. (2005) the model does not include a measure of CEO power. This should 
be inconsequential since Ahn et al. (2009) establish that Japanese CEOs have no effect on firm performance 
apart from a short-lived positive abnormal return on the day a CEO change is announced. In addition, Crossland 
and Hambrick (2007) demonstrate that Japanese cultural values (particularly high uncertainty avoidance and low 
individualism), high ownership concentration and low board independence lead to a relatively small CEO effect 
on a number of organizational outcomes. 
v Stock return volatility is computed using monthly observations. 
vi The data is identical to the one in Nikkei NEEDS which has been extensively used in Japanese accounting and 
finance research. AMSUS provides analytical tools useful for financial analysis and portfolio management.  
vii For instance, Sony Corp. had 38 directors, most of whom were executives responsible for individual business 
divisions. In 1997, the number of directors was cut to just 10 members (including 3 outside directors). Toyota 
had an even larger board consisting of 58 directors. Spurred by corporate governance reform at Sony, the car 
manufacturer decided in 2003 to trim the size of its board to 27 members (Yoshimori, 2005).  
viii In Cheng (2008) average firm age is about 25 years compared to 35 years in our sample. Direct comparison 
with Adams et al. (2005) cannot be made since firm age is measured by the number of years since incorporation.  
ix However, the regressions using the log of Tobin’s Q produce significantly higher R-squared. 
x The results in Table 2 only prove the existence of a positive correlation between stock options and risk taking 
and should not be viewed as demonstrating causality since we do not control for the endogeneity of the stock 
option indicator. In fact, Coles et al. (2006) indicate that high-risk firms are more likely to issue stock options. 
Nonetheless, endogeneity can bias the estimated coefficients on the other exogenous regressors. To ensure that 
this is not a serious problem, we re-estimate the risk (volatility) equations without the indicator of stock options. 
The coefficients on board size are found to be slightly more negative (by about 10 percent) which is consistent 
with the positive correlation between risk taking and the existence of executive stock options.  
xi Shareholders usually gain from higher corporate risk taking since equity is a call option on the firm’s assets. In 
contrast, debtholders lose since corporate debt involves the same payoff as a short put option on the firm’s assets.  
xii For more details on quantile regressions, see Koenker (2005). 
xiii We also use the percentage of shares held by individual investors for further sensitivity check. Since these two 
variables are highly correlated, we do not consider them jointly. Instead, we extract the main factor using 
principal component analysis and use it as instrument for board size. The result is qualitatively similar.  
xiv As Boubakri et al. (2011) we also use the difference between max and min performance over the sample 
period. The results with this risk measure are similar to those based on the standard deviation of performance.  
